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Abstract: On April 16, 2014, the South Korean ship MV Sewol sank, claiming
the lives of 304 passengers. The accident appeared to observers to be a man-
made disaster, since all the passengers could have been rescued if adequate safety
measures and disaster management procedures had been in place. The Sewol
sinking has subsequently turned into a focusing event in terms of safety policy
debates in South Korea. On September 28, 1994, the Swedish ship MS Estonia
sank, claiming the lives of 852 people. This earlier tragedy was also a focusing
event in the context of Swedish debates about safety policies. In this article, South
Korean and Swedish safety policies are analyzed from a historical-institutionalist
perspective. While Swedish disaster prevention systems have generally performed
well in a virtuous cycle, those of South Korea have performed poorly in a
vicious cycle. The article highlights how South Korean policy makers might use
Swedish policies, developed in response to the 1994 MS Estonia accident, to
improve their safety policies. In addition, we suggest that long-term policies
focusing on comprehensive social welfare and the pooling of risks are required
to restore citizens’ trust in government and to transform South Korea from a low
safety into a high safety society.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 16 2014, the South Korean ship MV Sewol sank near the southwestern
island of Jin-do. The tragedy claimed the lives of 304 people and immediately triggered
a nation-wide outpouring of grief due to the fact that pupils on a school trip made up a
significant proportion of the victims. The public quickly took note of the fact that the
Sewol disaster was man-made: if adequate safety measures and disaster management
procedures had been in place, it could have easily been prevented.
The media coverage subsequently focused on issues such as failure in disaster
management on the part of the South Korean government and the unethical business
practices of the people related to Chunghaejin Shipping, the holding company of the
MV Sewol. Families of the victims waited for months at Pang-Mok harbor in hope of
retrieving deceased bodies from the sea. Sentiment that the incompetency of the South
Korean government had been a major cause of the disaster was widespread. After the
disaster, 67 memorial sites were installed by citizens throughout the country, which
were visited by approximately 2,204,224 citizens during the first 100 days after the
sinking of the MV Sewol (Yonhapnews, 2014). Moreover, citizens expressed their
sympathy by wearing yellow ribbons. They also demanded the government legislate
new safety laws and conduct a thorough investigation of the circumstances of the
accident in order to punish those who had directly contributed to the chain of events
that triggered it.
In summary, the MV Sewol sinking has clearly been a focusing event for policy
making in South Korea in line with the definition advanced by Birkland (1998, p. 54),
namely one that is “sudden; relatively uncommon; can be reasonably defined as harm-
ful or revealing the possibility of potentially greater future harms; has harms that are
concentrated in a particular geographical area or community of interest; and […] is
known to policy makers and the public simultaneously.” Typically, a focusing event is
followed by a series of new policy developments in the relevant field. Thus, the South
Korean government might adopt or develop new safety-related policies in reaction to
the Sewol disaster. In this article, the Swedish case of the 1994 MS Estonia disaster,
which claimed the lives of 852 people, and the South Korean case of the 2014 MV
Sewol disaster are examined from a comparative point of view. We argue that the MS
Estonia disaster triggered improvements in safety policies in Sweden in line with a
“virtuous cycle” of policy making theorized in this article. We claim that South Korea
could learn important lessons from Sweden that could help it escape the existing
“vicious cycle” in the country’s policy making with regard to safety issues.
We put forward a two-tiered argument in this article. First, we present relevant data
on safety levels in Sweden and South Korea (as well as some other OECD countries
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for illustrative purposes) and analyze the underlying structural reasons for the relative
success and failure of safety policies in both countries. Second, we put forward a 
comparative case study of the MV Sewol and MS Estonia tragedies to test the theoretical
framework. We conclude by highlighting relevant Swedish policy lessons that South
Korean policy makers might adopt to improve safety levels in South Korea in the
future.
Figure 1 shows the level of road safety in OECD countries. Although South Kore-
an safety levels have improved over the past 20 years, there is a marked difference
between it and Sweden in this respect. Figure 2 shows the death rate due to industrial
accidents per 100,000 people in South Korea and Sweden. The industrial accident risk
in South Korea is higher than it is in Sweden. While there have been at least 20 man-
made major tragedies in South Korea since the 1950s, there were only six major disasters
overall—not all of them man-made—in Sweden during the same period (“major”
being defined in this article as an accident that results in more than 10 casualties).
Such differences in safety levels are due to different sets of safety management institu-
tions in both countries, resulting in the emergence of a vicious cycle and a virtuous
cycle, respectively.
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Figure 1. Road Accident Fatalities per Million Inhabitants
Source: OECD iLibrary.
In summary, Swedish disaster prevention systems have performed far better and
did so even before the focusing event of the MS Estonia tragedy than South Korean
disaster prevention systems. Even as the early industrialization period in South Korea
comes to a close, South Korea remains one of the least safe OECD societies. We thus
examine historical path dependencies, institutions, and actors in the safety field and
scrutinize how they interact with larger society in a comparative manner in order to
derive relevant policy lessons.
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Figure 2. Deaths from Industrial Accidents per 100,000
Source: ILO.
Note: ILO data derives from reports on occupational safety as submitted by national labor-related offices.
Available Japanese data on industrial accidents is not comparable and is omitted here. Available data
from South Korea, France, and Germany derives from reports on numbers of legally compensated
industrial deaths in line with the ILO’s latest definition. Data on Sweden, US, and UK derives from
reported deaths at work (the ILO’s former definition of death from industrial accidents). In addition,
data on South Korea and France covers only those workers who are registered for workmen’s acci-
dent compensation insurance (i.e. only “regular” workers are covered in the case of South Korea). In
turn, Swedish, US, and UK data represent all registered employees. Data on South Korea (2013), the
US (2001, 2002), Germany (2011, 2012, 2013), UK (2007, 2008, 2012, 2013), and Sweden (1990,
1991, 1992) is currently missing.
HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM
Historical institutionalism, the approach we use in this study, offers certain advantages
when conducting a small-N comparative case study. First, it examines institutions.
“The most common definition for institutions is: rules” (Steinmo, 2008, p. 123). The
logic of “institutions are rules” allows a consideration of all possible factors structuring
the behavior of socialized actors, including informal normalities, formal laws, formal
organizations, and informal networks (Steinmo, 2008). In other words, an analysis that
takes a historical institutionalist approach examines a large number of variables to test
a hypothesis. However, historical institutionalism does not define human beings as
mere rule-abiding automatons. Rather, historical institutionalism takes the strategic
behavior of actors who are surrounded by institutions into account. “Actors’ interpre-
tations of their interests [are] shaped by collective organizations and institutions that
bear traces of own history” (Immergut, 1998, p. 18). Furthermore, historical institu-
tionalism helps to explain contextual procedures and real world outcomes in existing
institutions (Steinmo, 2008). Since interests motivating certain actions of socialized
actors are contextually constructed, the resulting root causes of behavioral patterns
over relatively long time can be detected and analyzed by adopting a historical institu-
tionalist approach.
Most political science research in historical institutionalism highlights path depen-
dency and critical juncture in an effort to establish causality in actors’ behavior. As
Capoccia and Kelemen (2007, p. 341) state, “Many causal arguments in the historical
institutionalist literature postulate a dual model of institutional development characterized
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Figure 3. Vicious Cycle and Virtuous in South Korea and Sweden
Note: The two cycles are based on Beck 1986, D. Y. Kim 2014, G. A. Shin 2013, Hort (2014a, 2014b),




by relatively long periods of path-dependent institutional stability and reproduction
that are punctuated occasionally by brief phases of institutional flux—referred to as
critical junctures—during which more dramatic change is possible.”
Figure 3 shows the path-dependent logic of institutions in South Korea’s vicious
cycle and in Sweden’s virtuous cycle. The elements of each cycle are causes and effects
at the same time. Table 1 explains the historical background of the two contrasting
cycles.
Vicious Cycle in South Korea
The economic development of South Korea from the 1960s onward was guided by
the state. With regard to state activities, Kim Duk-yung (2014, p. 65) contends that
there was and still is a tendency “to reduce modernization to matters of the economy.”
Because modernization focused on the economy, other institutions such as political,
social, and cultural ones are relatively underdeveloped. Their development was only
promoted as long as they served the economic sector. As a result, South Korean society
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Table 1. Features of Modernization, Risk Management, and Trust in Government in South
Korea and Sweden
Economic/ South Korea SwedenPolitical Features
1) economic discourse as main 1) political dynamism based on 
modernization feature of politics from 1960s to multiparty system and developed 
based on economic 2010s civil society
reductionism 2) unequal wealth distribution, 2) egalitarian tradition already in 
versus high social inequality place before the development of 
comprehensive 3) role of labor unions before and the modern welfare state
modernization after democratization was 3) unions were major policy actors 
marginal throughout the twentieth century
1) nonexistence of basic social 1) comprehensive welfare and 
individualized risk welfare institutions additional voluntary organizations
management (e.g., education and health care (e.g., Church of Sweden)
versus
are mostly private) 2) developed welfare system 
collectivized risk 2) market-driven globalization and moderates negative effects of 
management “marketized individualization” globalization3) Emphasis on competitive 3) Emphasis on the self as part of 
individualism a larger community
low trust in 1) “what has government done for 1) willingness to pay high taxes
government me?” mentality 2) high trust in government by 
versus 2) very low trust in government in OECD standards, which has 
high trust in comparison to other OECD been stable over long periods 
government countries of time 
did not achieve comprehensive modernization (D. Y. Kim, 2014).
The reduction of modernization to economic development came during the Park
Chung-hee regime (1961-1979) with the introduction of the five-year national plans.
The Chun Doo-hwan regime (1980-1988) and the Roh Tae-woo administration (1988-
1993) continued along the path established by the Park regime. The democratization
movements of the working- and new middle classes in the 1980s ultimately failed to
overturn the reductionist model.
During the Kim Young-sam administration (1993-1998), South Korea’s economy
suffered a blow as a result of the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998. In reaction to
the crisis, the IMF required that formerly state-guided sectors and the labor market be
deregulated in order for South Korea to qualify for financial loans. The Kim Dae-jung
administration (1998-2003), the first liberal government in the history of South Korea,
was also affected by the financial crisis and was unable to transform the existing insti-
tutional setting. The Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003-2008), the second liberal
government, introduced the agenda of “the era of $20,000 GDP per capita” at the initial
phase of its term, and institutions were expected to support this agenda.
Throughout Kim’s and Roh’s terms, the organized pattern of economic reductionism
became even more entrenched and efforts to introduce new modes of policy making
such as institutionalized social dialogue between employers and unions failed. The
election pledge of the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration (2008-2013) was
“7-4-7.” This indicated a scheme to aim for “7 percent of GDP growth to achieve
$40,000 GDP per capita within 7 years,” which turned out to be vastly unrealistic. The
current conservative Park Geun-hye administration (2013-2018) announced plans to
lead a “second Han River miracle” with the concept of a “creative economy.” However,
the government has so far mostly focused on new deregulatory policies, and the presi-
dent has described regulations in this context as “a lump of cancer” (Park, 2014).
In summary, there exists a clear path dependency in South Korean state governance
that is grounded in economic reductionism, which is replicated and reinforced in other
institutional settings of South Korean society. For example, education is primarily a
tool for becoming more successful in the labor market, and families are expected to
assist economic development as providers of welfare services covering societal risks
such as unemployment, poverty, elderly care, and child care.
The Park Chung-hee regime implemented the idea of basing the national economy
on chaebols, that is, family-owned and export-oriented industrial conglomerates pro-
ducing goods and services in many different economic sectors. This policy forced non-
chaebol companies to serve the needs of the larger corporations. Crucially, chaebol
companies adopted a “company is family” ideology (D. Y. Kim, 2014, p. 186) to make
employees obedient. Whenever workers organized themselves in independent unions,
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the state suppressed these activities. At present, union membership in South Korea
amounts to only 9.9 percent while that of Sweden is 67.7 percent as shown in figure 4.
The underdeveloped institutional pluralism in South Korea—with low union mem-
bership serving as an example here—is directly related to the dominance of individu-
alized risk management in society. In this context, Ulrich Beck’s argument (1986; 
published in Korean in 1997 by Saemulgyul) that modernization produces a new kind
of “risk society” is relevant. According to Beck, modernization initially takes off as
fight against material scarcity and triggers social conflict over the distribution of
wealth. Later on, this competition over scarce resources starts overlapping with and is
partially replaced by conflicts over new social risks, i.e. risks introduced by the
increasing institutional and scientific complexity of advanced societies.
Shin Gyung-ah (2013) discusses Beck’s concept of a risk society in the South
Korean context, arguing that society imposes risks on citizens without providing
socially institutionalized welfare mechanisms, in contrast to Swedish society, where risk
is collectively managed in an “imagined national welfare community” (Hort, 2014b, 
p. 31). In other words, Koreans experience what has been described as “marketized
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Figure 4. Trade Union Density
Source: OECD iLibrary and KOSIS Economically Active Population Survey 2015 for Korean data of 2012
and 2013.
individualization” (Shin, 2013, p. 277). In these circumstances, the market acts as the
major social institution due to large gaps in the social insurance system in comparison
with other OECD societies.
As a result, the community self is not fostered. Instead, competitive individualism
is systematically cultivated in South Korean society. This competitive individualism is
further reinforced by the fact that citizens have to manage risk individually because
they cannot expect help from society. South Korean citizens’ expectation that collec-
tivized risk management is ineffective is reconfirmed whenever governmental disaster
management systems fail. Figure 5 shows the share of total social expenditure in gross
domestic product (GDP) for OECD countries. South Korea stands out as the country
with by far the lowest share of social expenditure in the OECD other than Mexico (a
country with a much lower GDP per capita). Figure 6 shows that South Korean citizens
must also cover education expenditures privately, which represents a major long-term
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Figure 5. Total Social Expenditure from Public Sources (in Percentage of Gross Domestic
Product)
Source: OECD iLibrary.
investment on their part, while Swedish citizens mostly cover such costs collectively.
In fact, private education spending in South Korea was according to 2011 data the
highest in the OECD world.
Thus, different levels of trust in government relate to the relative ability of OECD
states to effectively manage risk. Whenever governments fail to provide effective risk
management, people may question the utility of paying taxes to the government. The
comparative data on trust in government underlines that levels of trust in government
are very low in South Korea compared to other OECD countries, as figure 7 shows.
In conclusion, low trust in government and citizens’ failure to comply with laws
and regulations mutually reinforce each other. According to Max Weber, the concepts
of power and authority differ in the sense that power is “the probability that one actor
within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resis-
tance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests,” whereas authority is “a
situation in which a leader’s command is taken by the follower and acted on as if the
follower valued the action for its own sake” (1978, p. 53, p. 946). In a democratic
society, citizens are expected to voluntarily accept state authority rather than be sub-
jected to state power. Yet if citizens do not trust the government, they will not value
state-imposed rules. Since the South Korean government enjoys little trust, it is not
44 A Historical-Institutionalist Analysis of the MV Sewol and MS Estonia Tragedies
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
Figure 6. Private Spending on Education for all Levels, % of GDP in 2011 (Source:
OECD, Education Database, latest available figures)
surprising that citizens frequently fail to comply with laws and regulations, which,
among other factors, greatly increases the possibility that accidents will occur.
Thus South Korean citizens do not tend to rely on state institutions when it comes
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Figure 7. Confidence in National Government, 2012 (%)
Source: OECD, 2014.
to risk management. Instead, they rely on their individual relationship with the market,
which turns money into the major resource of individualized risk management. A low
trust in government causes South Korean citizens to recklessly pursue economic
advantage while ignoring laws and regulations. This vicious cycle is the cause and
also the effect of the frequent occurrence of major disasters. As long as the vicious
cycle remains intact, it will be reinforced and will become even further entrenched as
time passes.
Virtuous Cycle in Sweden
The virtuous cycle in Sweden owes the following features: (1) comprehensive
modernization; (2) collectivized risk management; and (3) high trust in government.
The roots of comprehensive modernization in Sweden date to the late nineteenth century.
Although Sweden was at that time a very poor country, similar to South Korea in the
1950s, it was free of a developed feudalist system. This early relative egalitarianism
allowed political freedom to develop in line with economic modernization and indus-
trialization from the late 1870s onward. Shortly after, the first welfare bills—inspired
partially by Bismarckian Sozialpolitk in Germany—were passed. A coalition of liberal
social reformers and agrarian interests emerged, which was at a later point taken over
by the Social Democratic Party (founded in 1889), acting in alliance with the emerging
labor unions.
In the 1930s and again after World War II, Sweden expanded its welfare system in
areas such as pensions, sickness insurance, child allowances, child support, housing,
and labor policies. This expansion helped to reinforce the strength of the alliance of
Social Democrats and the trade unions, leading an observer to suggest that “a certain
Social Democratic ‘mentality’ has slowly been penetrating Swedish society, politics,
and culture: easy to feel, harder to define and clarify” (Hort, 2014a, p. 102). The 1960s
were the golden era of welfare policy, during which time it was further expanded in
the fields of health care and education, which resulted in “improved social security
among the total population; greater equality between the social classes and between
single persons and families as well as between retired people and the labor force; and 
a reduction or elimination of poverty” (Hort, 2014a, p. 155). These developments
eventually produced an “imagined community” with high social trust and collectivized
risk management institutions.
Thus, risk society in Sweden is buffered by a community self, and Swedish citizens
generally accept the necessity of paying high taxes to maintain a generous welfare
state, which in turn enjoys high levels of trust. Several explanatory variables for 
the stability of the Swedish “imagined community” can be found. First, a fairly low
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degree of social inequality facilitates high levels of social trust (Rothstein and Uslaner,
2005). Second, there is a high degree of equality of opportunity in the Swedish education
system, as the near absence of private spending on education underlines. By contrast,
the Korean share of private spending on education is the highest in the OECD world,
as shown in figure 6. Third, state institutions in Sweden enjoy very high degrees of
trust, as measured by both perceptions of how well corruption is handled as well by
how in fact it is managed (see figures 8 and 9). Finally, it has also been argued that
high quality universal welfare services are self-reinforcing. Thus, Swedish citizens
continue to put their trust in the government due to positive experiences with the services
on offer and the perception of fairness in their delivery (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005).
Figures 7, 8, and 9 all add credence to the arguments of Rothstein and Uslaner that
“trust, inequality and corruption are all sticky, none of them changes much over time”
(2005, p. 65), and that “it seems as if the old saying is true: Once the system gets there,
it stays there” (2005, p. 72). The Swedish experience suggests that proactive govern-
ments that opt to further develop welfare systems can potentially construct high trust
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Figure 8. Corruption Perception Index
Source: Transparency International, 2014.
Note: “The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their
public sector is perceived to be. It is a composite index—a combination of polls—drawing on corruption-
related data collected by a variety of reputable institutions. The CPI reflects the views of … experts living
and working in the countries and territories evaluated” (Transparency International, 2014).
societies, which in turn might motivate citizens to comply with laws and regulations.
Yet the opposite logic might also apply: virtuous and vicious cycles are both subject to
public policy, and entrenched path dependency can be challenged if the political will
to do so exists.
Although a virtuous cycle prevails in Sweden, this does not mean that no accidents
have occurred. There have been six major accidents (“major” being defined as an 
accident with more than 10 casualties) since the 1950s (Swedish Civil Contingencies
Agency, 2014). More recently, there have been two accidents, excluding the MS Estonia
disaster. The first one was a tram accident in 1992 in Göteborg, which killed 13 people
and injured 35. Subsequent policy development focused on improving the training and
equipment of workers rather than target blaming (Sveriges Television, 1992). The second
major accident was a discotheque fire in 1998 in Göteborg in which 63 young people
died and 190 were injured. Following the accident, an investigative commission made
21 recommendations to different institutions (Statens Haverikommission, 2001).
Although not all of the recommendations became law, a lead representative of the
Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, Patrik Perbeck, argues that awareness of safety
policies improved, and no similar accidents have occurred since then (Dagens Nyheter,
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Figure 9. Control of Corruption
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2014.
Note: “This indicator measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests. It
also measures the strength and effectiveness of a country’s policy and institutional framework to 
prevent and combat corruption” (Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2014).
2009).
Finally, it is important to mention current welfare retrenchment in Sweden, although
it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss it at length. Here it is sufficient to 
state that while privatization tends to individualize social risks in Sweden too, Swedish
citizens still enjoy generous welfare provisions by comparison with other countries
and retrenchment has been modest compared to the rest of the OECD world. The pur-
pose of this section has been to demonstrate how comprehensive modernization and
welfare development have interacted in Swedish society and how this allowed for both
collective risk management and the building of a high trust society that has been stable
over time, which in turn has sustained the three elements of the virtuous cycle.
The next section explains how Swedish policy makers dealt with the worst shipping
accident in the country’s history.
THE MS ESTONIA TRAGEDY AND SUBSEQUENT 
POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN SWEDEN
The MS Estonia sank on September 28, 1994, claiming 852 lives, including 501
Swedes and 290 Estonians. The ship was first put into service by the Finnish company
Rederiaktiebolaget in 1980 to serve routes between Turku (Finland), Mariehamn (Fin-
land), and Stockholm (Sweden). In 1993 it was sold to the Estonian company Estline
Maritime Company. All members of the crew were credentialed, and the language of
communication on board was Estonian, which was understood by everybody.
The MS Estonia departed from Stockholm at 7:15 pm on September 27 with 989
people on board. The weather was initially fair, with a moderate breeze and showers,
but it subsequently turned worse, and some passengers reported being seasick just
after midnight. At 01:00 am, one of the crew heard a large bang as a wave hit the bow
of the ship. He reported this as a normal event, since he could see nothing out of the
ordinary. However, the bow visor of the MS Estonia was subsequently torn off at 1:15
am, and seawater started to invade. At 1:20 am, the crew issued an alarm, and the first
mayday call was registered at 1:22 am. The water entered the ship very quickly, and it
completely disappeared from radar at 1:50 am. Government rescue efforts were only
initiated an hour after the Estonia had sunk, and a rescue helicopter finally arrived at
03:05 am, although four other boats had reached the scene of the accident shortly after
the mayday call. Only 138 passengers were ultimately saved. During the following
three days, 92 bodies were recovered from the water, while the other passengers
remained unaccounted for.
After the catastrophe, it was learned that the MS Estonia had been hurriedly con-
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structed and that many parts of the ship had been contracted out by the Finnish manufac-
turer. This included the bow visor that broke off on the night of the accident, resulting in
the ship’s sinking. At the time of the disaster, other ships also had the type of bow
visor the Estonia had. According to the official report, the major technical reason for
the disaster was that “no safety margin was built into the bow visors” and that “the
ship building industry’s experience … was limited and construction groundwork for
bow visors was not well established” (Joint Accident Investigation Commission, 1998,
pp. 224-225). Crucially, the report suggested that the accident was not due to issues
related to corruption, failure on the part of the crew, or clear-cut regulatory failures.
Instead, the extreme weather conditions on the night of the accident created a “black
swan” disaster that overpowered all existing safety measures.
Institutional Responses to the MS Estonia Accident
After the sinking of the MS Estonia, the Swedish government collaborated with all
involved parties to set up institutions to examine the causes of the accident. Table 2
summarizes the major activities in the first year after the accident.
Directly after the accident, on September 29, 1994, after a meeting of the prime
ministers of Finland, Estonia, and Sweden, a joint accident investigation commission
was formed to examine the technical causes of the accident. A second group,
“analysgruppen,” was formed by the Swedish government to examine the behavior of
all state bodies (including parastatal bodies) that were involved in dealing with the
accident and its repercussions.
The commission was initially made up of nine maritime and judicial experts from
the three countries—Sweden, Estonia, Finland—with only one career politician join-
ing. It had the freedom to work independently from national governments. The
analysgruppen, which is further discussed in the next section, consisted of five
Swedish nationals (three academics, one union leader, and the head of the Swedish
Red Cross).
In 1998, an international maritime safety conference was held in Stockholm at
which recommendations that arose from the investigation were discussed (Joint Accident
Investigation Commission Report, 1998). In 2001, the Swedish Maritime Administration
organized another international maritime safety seminar whose goal was to interna-
tionalize Swedish policy lessons. This internationalization of policy learning from the
MS Estonia accident led the International Maritime Organization to issue stricter safety
requirements for ferries (Dagens Nyheter, 2014).
The responses to the MS Estonia accident reflected Swedish collectivized risk
management in a number of ways. First, discussions on the MS Estonia accident were
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held between leaders of all parliamentary parties of Sweden in 1994, 1996, 1997, and
1999, demonstrating that all parties were collectively taking up the issue of crisis and
risk management. Second, October 2 was declared a national day of mourning, and a
tax-financed national memorial place containing the names of all the deceased, except
for those of 37 victims whose families requested otherwise, was set up in Djurgården,
Stockholm, in 1995. The memorial site ensures that there is a space where the tragedy
will be remembered, and its construction can also be seen as an act of trust building.
Sweden’s decision in 1995, together with Finland and Estonia, to sanctify the area
where the Estonia wreck is located, protecting the graveyard, likewise built trust.
Finally, annual memorial ceremonies were held for two decades after the disaster.
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Table 2. Swedish Policy Responses to the MS Estonia Accident
September 28: the Swedish prime minister meets with the prime ministers of Estonia
and Finland; they decide to set up the Joint Accident Investigation Commission.
September 28: the Swedish prime minister establishes an emergency group, which has 
its first meeting that day and starts contacting different agencies to deal with the aftermath 
of the disaster.
September 30: the Swedish Maritime Safety Inspectorate begins inspecting all passenger 
vessels arriving in Swedish harbors.
October 2: national day of mourning.
October 3: minute of silence in parliament.
October 18: party leaders’ meeting.
October 19: the Minister of Communication announces that the government has instructed 
the Swedish Maritime Administration to conduct an analysis regarding how to handle the 
1994 bodies of the victims of the accident.
October 20: the Public Art Agency is instructed to investigate what is required to establish
a place of mourning.
November 3: a representative is appointed by the government to help the victims to 
promote their interest.
December 1: the government decides to provide financial assistance to organizations 
of relatives of the victims.
December 7: party leaders’ meeting.
December 12: party leaders’ meeting.
December 15: the government decides not to salvage the vessel and the disaster site 
is declared a graveyard.
December 22: the government establishes the Maritime Safety Committee, which is 
charged with developing ways to improve maritime safety.
April 7: the Joint Accident Investigation Commission publishes an interim report 
concerning technical aspects of the accident.
1995 June 1: the parliament approves the decision to sanctify the accident site.
September 28: one year after the accident, several memorial events are held throughout
the country. 
Trust Building after the Estonia Tragedy
In terms of long-term policies responding to the Estonia disaster, the decision of
the Swedish government in 2001 to set up a public and state-financed online archive
of documents (Estoniasamlingen) on the MS Estonia tragedy was highly significant.
(The resources of this archive have also been utilized in this article.) The website was
set up by an agency of the Swedish Ministry of Defense, and since 2011, it has been
managed by the Swedish National Archives. It includes all available information on
the disaster. Target audiences of the archive are mainly survivors, people related to
victims, people who are working on maritime security issues, journalists, students, and
the general public. The creation of the online archive underlined that the government
was not trying to hide what happened or to make people forget. The provision of
value-neutral information has helped to sustain the virtuous cycle of high trust in
Swedish society.
The second Swedish government initiative that deserves attention is the analysgruppen.
The government appointed this group to examine how different societal actors, including
state agencies and various voluntary and religious organizations, behaved during and
after the crisis. Special emphasis was placed on organizations that relatives of the victims
were associated with, which played a major role in helping families cope with their
loss.
The group was transparent and the government did not interfere, thus giving it a lot
of freedom. Several public hearings and seminars were conducted, and a reference group
consisting of survivors and relatives of the deceased further enhanced transparency.
The analysgruppen helped to restore trust in government activities, which was important
because the government and its agencies had initially been criticized for not handling
the crisis adequately and for not giving priority to the victims. Although the responsi-
bility to handle a crisis of this scope lay largely with the government, the forming of
the analysgruppen demonstrated that the government subscribed to the principle of
collectivized risk management. All political parties agreed that the analysgruppen was
needed and that it revived the society, helped citizens to regain trust, and facilitated
policy learning (Sveriges Riksdag, 1997). In this context, the group’s independence
was crucial; other countries should learn from this example that independence and
transparency are critical to a successful outcome.
These institutional developments have helped to preserve a virtuous cycle in Sweden.
The policy initiatives introduced in the wake of the MS Estonia accident show that
Sweden has retained its comprehensive modernization strategy. Risk is still collectively
managed, and trust in government remains high.
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THE MV SEWOL TRAGEDY AND SUBSEQUENT 
POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH KOREA
The entrenchment of a vicious cycle in Korea has produced numerous disasters.
Table 3 shows the three elements of the vicious cycle discussed in section 2, namely
(1) economic reductionism, (2) individualized risk management, and (3) low trust in
government. The MV Sewol tragedy displays all three elements of this cycle.
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Table 3. Major South Korean Disasters, 1953-2003
Economic Individualized Low Trust NotableDisaster (Year) Reductionism Risk in AspectsManagement Government
• 229 out of 236 
passengers died
MV Chang-gyung • noncompliance with 





• 140 out of 141 
passengers died
MV Yun-ho • noncompliance with 
sinking O O O regulations: ignored 
(1963) storm alert; passenger 
and freight overload
(DongA-Ilbo, 1963)
• 323 out of 338 
passengers died
• corruption
• noncompliance with 
regulations: ignored 
storm alert; passenger 
MV Nam-yung and freight overload; 
sinking O O O illegal reconstruction





Economy Seoul, 2009; 
Kang, 2014) 
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Economic Individualized Low Trust NotableDisaster (Year) Reductionism Risk in AspectsManagement Government
• 33 deaths, 40 injuries
• corruption
• noncompliance with 
Wau apartment regulations: cheap 
building collapse O O O building materials




• 164 deaths, 63 injuries
• malfunctioning disaster 
Dae-yeon-gak prevention system: the 
hotel fire O hotel lacked basic safety 
(1971) features such as 
sprinklers and a helipad 
(Team EEJ, 2014)
• 66 deaths, 35 injuries
• reckless economic 
pursuit: owner stopped 
Dae-wang fleeing customers to ask 
Corner fire O O O for payment
(1974) • malfunctioning disaster prevention system: no 
training sessions had 
been supplied
(Team EEJ, 2014)
• 27 deaths, 48 injuries
• reckless economic 
Woo-am pursuit: substandard 
commercial construction
complex O O O • noncompliance with apartment regulations: illegal 
collapse construction
(1993) (MBCnews, 1993; 
T. H. Kim, 2006b; 
Team EEJ, 2014)
Moogunghwa • 56 deaths, 110 injuries
train accident at • noncompliance with 
Busan Gu-po O O regulations: nearby 
station construction ignored 
(1993) safety regulations(MBCnews, 1993)
• 19 deaths, 10 injuries
Yeonchun • malfunctioning disaster 
Reserve Army prevention system: no 
Gunshot Training O training sessions had 
Center explosion been offered
(1993) (MBCnews, 1993; 
Team EEJ, 2014) 
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Economic Individualized Low Trust NotableDisaster (Year) Reductionism Risk in AspectsManagement Government
• 73 out of 106 passengers
died
• malfunctioning disaster 
prevention system: 
Asiana Airline possible threat on 
733 plane crash O O O landing strip
(1993) • reckless economic pursuit: internal regulations 
appealed to in order to 
place blame on pilot 
(MBCnews, 1993; 
Team EEJ, 2014)
• 292 out of 362 
passengers died
• noncompliance of 
passengers with 
MV Seohae regulations
sinking O O O • no disaster prevention 
(1993) system in place
• deregulation increased 
the likelihood of accidents
(J. G. Kim, 2004; 
Kang, 2014)
• 32 deaths, 17 injuries




Seongsu Bridge • malfunctioning disaster 
collapse O O prevention system: safety
(1994) check-ups not performed 





• 12 deaths, 101 injuries, 
555 affected sam
A-hyun-dong • malfunctioning disaster 
City gas O prevention system: 
explosion training sessions not 
(1994) supplied
(Naver Digital Archive, 
1994; Team EEJ, 2014) 
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Economic Individualized Low Trust NotableDisaster (Year) Reductionism Risk in AspectsManagement Government
• 102 deaths, 117 injuries
• noncompliance with 
regulations: construction 
undertaken without permit
• malfunctioning disaster 
Daegu Metro prevention system: no 
construction site O O O safety impact assessmentgas explosion conducted, no information
(1995) system created to 
document the buried 
pipes underground
(Park, et al., 2004; 
T. H. Kim, 2006a; 
Team EEJ, 2014).
• 501 deaths, 937 injuries, 
6 missing
• corruption
• reckless economic 
Sampoong pursuit: substandard 
department store O O O construction
collapse • noncompliance with 
(1995) regulations: illegal 
construction
(MBCnews, 1995; 
J. S. Kim, 2014; 
Team EEJ, 2014)
• 108 deaths
Gyung-gi • malfunctioning disaster 
boarding school O prevention system: no fire safety personnel in place 
(1995) and doors were locked
(Team EEJ, 2014)
• 23 deaths
• corruption led to 
malfunctioning of the 
Sea Land Youth disaster prevention 
Training Center O O O system
fire (1999) • noncompliance with 
regulations
• no safety personnel 
in place
(Hani, 2013) 
Table 3 outlines South Korean major accidents and is based on a newspaper survey
conducted for the current article. Notably, it includes only incidents that are clearly
related to at least one of the three elements of the vicious cycle. Yet even this highly
restricted list—which does not take into account those incidents that were not reported
on, owing to newspaper censorship before democratization in 1988—confirms that
South Korea has a long track record of disasters, supporting the theoretical perspective
adopted here. The important point is that the MV Sewol tragedy does not differ sub-
stantially from earlier tragedies.
This section now proceeds to outline the basic facts regarding the MV Sewol
tragedy, as they are currently known. The ship was built in 1994 at Hayashikane Shipyard
in Japan; Chunghaejin Shipping purchased and imported it to South Korea in October
2012 to undergo reconstruction. On April 15, 2014, at 9:00 pm, the MV Sewol, with
476 aboard, including 29 crew members, 325 students, and 15 teachers, departed
Incheon after a delay of two and half hours due to thick fog. On April 16, at 8:52 am
the MV Sewol started tilting close to the island of Jin-Do.
According to Byun (2014), there are three possible reasons a ship may capsize: a
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Economic Individualized Low Trust NotableDisaster (Year) Reductionism Risk in AspectsManagement Government
• 57 deaths, 80 injuries
• corruption
• malfunctioning disaster 
prevention system: 
Incheon pub fire safety training sessions 
(1999) O O not supplied
• reckless economic 
pursuit: owner stopped 
fleeing customers to ask 
for payment
(Lee, 2007)
• 192 died, 151 injured
• malfunctioning disaster 
prevention system: safety
training sessions not 




2005; Team EEJ, 2014)
Note: Information derived primarily from newspaper archives (Kyunghyang, DongA-Ilbo, Hani, Naver Digital
Archive, and Yonhapnews), news broadcasts (MBCnews and Team EEJ), and white papers of the
National Archive of Korea and Daegu Metropolitan City.
rising in the center of gravity, a rapid shifting of freight, and a rapid turnabout con-
ducted by a crew member, all of which all adversely affect the stability of ships. These
factors all seem to have been at play in the case of the MV Sewol. The center of gravity
of the ship had been raised during its reconstruction. In addition, the amount of cargo
carried on the morning of the accident was more than twice the legal limit, and there
was not enough ballast water to balance the ship (Board of Audit and Inspection,
2014). After an overangled rapid turnabout at Maeng-Gol channel, which has the second
quickest current within the sea areas of South Korea, the ship capsized (Joongang Il-
Bo, 2014). The decision to take the turnabout was made by the third mate of the crew,
who had less than one year of work experience (Oh, 2014). The ship tilted due to a
combination of poor navigation, freight overload, and lack of ballast water.
A student traveling on the Sewol called the firefighting headquarters of South Jeolla
Province at 8:52 am, and the firefighters passed the emergency call on to Mok-Po
Coast Guard at 8:55 am. At that time, a crew member of MV Sewol called Jeju Vessel
Traffic Service (VTS) to request rescue aid, and Jeju VTS informed Jeju Coast Guard
about the accident, but this unit did not respond since it was not in charge of the area
where the ship had capsized. Finally the crew of the MV Sewol communicated with
Jindo VTS, which was in charge of the area, at 9:06 am. The Mok-Po Coast Guard
sent a helicopter and a ship to the accident scene, which arrived on the scene at 9:30
am and 9:35 am, respectively, rescuing the captain and crew first at 9:46 am. Yet the
coast guard did not call on the passengers to leave the ship. Instead, there were only
prerecorded voice announcements being made on the MV Sewol, asking the passengers
to “not move” until 10:10 am. At 11:18 am, the ship completely sank. The diving rescuers
from the Mok-Po Coast Guard and the West Sea Regional Coast Guard were very late,
arriving at the accident site at 11:15 am and 11:20 am, respectively. Ultimately, the
rescue team was able to save the lives of only 172 of the 476 passengers (Minbyun,
2014). Table 4 shows the category and distribution of saved and deceased passengers.
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Table 4.
Total Students Teachers Ship Crew Service Crew Others
Number 476 325 14 15 14 108
Saved 172 75 2 15 5 75
Deceased 304 250 12 0 9 33
Save Rate 36% 23% 14% 100% 36% 70%
Source: Minbyun, 2014: 30.
Modernization Based on Economic Reductionism
Socialized actors are influenced by institutions, and the actors in the MV Sewol
tragedy were no exception. As discussed in section 2, South Korea’s political discourse
focuses on economic growth, deregulation, and privatization.
Under the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations, in particular, dereg-
ulatory policies were pursued to “invigorate” the coastwise vessel industry. In 2009,
the inspection regime for ships was deregulated, and inspections were only conducted
after 9,000 hours of service rather than after 7,000 hours. Prior to deregulation, shipping
companies were only allowed to load preapproved cars and freight onto car ferries
such as the MV Sewol. In 2009, this criterion was loosened, and in addition, freight
could now be fixed with ropes on the deck, while the earlier regulations demanded it
to be firmly fixed with wedges. Another deregulation concerned how long ships could
be operated, which was extended from 20 to 30 years (Minbyun, 2014).
Following the 2009 deregulation, the number of vessels older than 15 years imported
by Korean shipping companies increased from 29.4 percent to 63.2 percent. Between
2005 and 2013, the number of vessels older than 20 years increased seven times, to 24
percent of all ships, and that of ships with between 16 to 20 years of service tripled (J.
S. Kim, 2014). Before deregulation, ships with more than 15 years of service were
subject to special supervisory measures; under the new policy, ships were not subject
to such measures until after 20 years of service (Minbyun, 2014).
The Park Geun-hye administration also revised the Seaman Enforcement Ordinance,
so that South Korean captains were no longer required to submit documents about the
conduct of inspections and first or second mates could now be delegated to lead the
ship when captains were absent. In addition, shipping companies were now permitted to
hire temporary workers for maintenance and repairs (Roh, 2014). Without deregulation,
the Chunghaejin Shipping Company might not have considered importing the 18-year-
old MV Sewol in the first place, freight would not have moved toward a corner after
the ship’s sudden turnabout, and an inexperienced third mate would not have been in
charge of the ship. In this context, one should also note that South Korean coastwise
vessels did not meet international standards even before the 2009 and 2013 deregula-
tions (Cho, 2014).
Chunghaejin Shipping pursued economic profit in a relentless manner. First, the
company minimized investment in security, spending only 0.001 percent of total revenue
on safety training sessions in 2013. Second, the company did not place a high priority
on its crews. Three of the five MV Sewol crew members, including the captain, were
temporary workers. Their overall salaries were 20 percent to 30 percent lower than
those paid by other coastwise shipping companies (Minbyun, 2014). This poor treatment
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and the lack of safety training clearly played a role in the way the crew responded 
during the disaster.
Third, Chunghaejin Shipping failed to comply with regulations in order to further
increase profit. Before the disaster, the crew of MV Sewol falsified documents indicating
the amount of cargo and the number of loaded cars on the ship when reporting to the
Korean Shipping Association that is in charge of passenger and freight safety. The
reported amount was 657 tons of cargo and 150 cars, but the cargo in fact amounted to
2,142 tons and the number of cars was 185 (Board of Audit and Inspection, 2014).
The ballast water tanks for stabilizing the ship were not sufficiently filled: the ship was
supposed to have 1565 tons of ballast water, but on the day of the disaster, it only carried
761 tons (Roh, 2014). This fabricated reporting risked the lives of passengers, yet the
company falsified documents for 56 out of 118 tours between January and April 2014
(Board of Audit and Inspection, 2014).
Fourth, it was disclosed that the MV Sewol crew bribed three commissioners in 
the Incheon Coast Guard after the ship’s reconstruction into allowing Chunghaejin
Shipping to skip submitting several crucial documents, which turned out to contribute
to the tragedy (Roh, 2014). Finally, in order to get the approval for the reconstruction
from the Korean Register of Shipping, Chunghaejin Shipping reported the ship’s
weight as 100 tons lower than it was and overstated the capacity of the ship to carry
cars (Roh, 2014). Ultimately, the incompetency of the Korean Register of Shipping
and the fabrications of Chunghaejin Shipping were jointly responsible for the Sewol
tragedy.
Individualized Risk Management
The behavior of captain and crew of the MV Sewol on the day of the accident
clearly underlined the absence of a community self. The captain was supposed to lead
the crew to deal with the disaster instead of being the first one to escape from the tilting
ferry. Other actors also demonstrated an absence of a community self, namely, the
executive members of the Ministry of Security and Public Administration who took
souvenir photographs (News1, 2014), misinformed broadcasters who tried to scoop the
story, and members of the coast guard who overstated their rescuing activities (Roh,
2014). They were mostly concerned with their individual selves and failed to live up
to the challenge.
More generally, South Korea’s disaster prevention system, which is expected to
collectively manage crisis situations, malfunctioned in the MV Sewol case. According
to the Maritime Security Act, the Korea Coast Guard is the core actor of South
Korea’s disaster prevention system (Roh, 2014). If the rescue efforts of the coast guard
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had been successful, the accident would not have turned deadly. However, the rescue
process revealed a lack of training and professionalism from beginning to end. The
“Manual for Maritime Searching and Rescuing” and a checklist for how to proceed if
a ship capsizes explicitly state that rescuers should enter sinking ships to check
whether passengers are wearing life jackets and are able to leave the ship immediately.
Yet the coast guard did not enter the MV Sewol and did not instruct passengers to escape,
since the crew, who were equipped with the means of communication, had already left
the scene (Roh, 2014). After this display of incompetency, the crew members mali-
ciously tampered with documents, claiming that they ordered the passengers to get 
out at 9:35 am when in fact they had told the passengers to stay put until 10:10 am
(Minbyun, 2014). Moreover, the regional coast guard was not properly trained; the
number of training sessions held between 2010 and 2013 was more than half below
what was stipulated by the law (Board of Audit and Inspection, 2014).
Jeju VTS and Jindo VTS, which are in charge of observing the relevant sea areas,
should have been key actors as well. Jeju VTS initially talked to the crew of the MV
Sewol and should have used the 30-minute window of time after the accident wisely.
Yet Jeju VTS only informed Jeju Coast Guard, which was not in charge of the area
where the accident had occurred, and failed to inform the Jindo VTS, which was in
charge of the area. Jeju and Jindo VTS lacked communication channels, as they
belonged to two different government bodies, namely, the Ministry of Oceans and
Fisheries and the coast guard, respectively. Thus, Jindo VTS became aware of the
accident only after a significant delay (Minbyun, 2014).
There were other institutional failures as well. For example, the Korean Register of
Shipping should have spotted that the freight distribution on the reconstructed MV Sewol
was dangerous—exceedingly top heavy—and should not have allowed Chunghaejin
Shipping to proceed, and the managers of the Korean Shipping Association should
have conducted proper safety checks before the ship launched on the day of the disaster
(Board of Audit and Inspection, 2014).
These institutional failures indicate a structural proneness to corruption in the safety
management system of the shipping industry as a whole. The current system is
monopolized by two actors, namely, the Korean Register of Shipping and the Korean
Shipping Association. In this context, the only supervisory governmental organization
is the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries; yet liaison between the ministry, on the one
hand, and the registry and association, on the other, is obvious. In fact, 10 out of the 12
former chief directors of the Korean Shipping Association and 8 out of the 11 chief
directors of the Korean Register of Shipping were appointed after retiring from the
Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries. In 2014, 11 out of 14 public organizations related to
the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries also had executives who had previously held a
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position in the ministry: such close-knit connection raises questions about the integrity
of the disaster prevention system in South Korea (Roh, 2014).
These networks are the legacy of state-led modernization in South Korea, since
public officials traditionally had to form a special liaison with related corporations and
with respective ministries for the effective mobilization of resources. Today this heritage
remains in the form of personnel liaisons between ministries and relevant governmental
organizations serving certain functions under the ministries. Once senior officials retire
from their ministries, they become lobbyists who seek to link their former workplaces
with other governmental organizations. This could perhaps be justified as long as such
retired officials were qualified to conduct practical supervisory work. However, if it
leads to corruption and the malfunctioning of state institutions, it starts to risk the lives
of citizens. Observers have used the term “bureau-fia,” which is a neologism combining
the words “bureaucrat” and “mafia,” to describe this relationship between ministries
and former ministry officials and have suggested that the failure of the Ministry of
Oceans and Fisheries to effectively supervise the Korean Register of Shipping and the
Shipping Association before the Sewol Disaster illustrates the concept (Roh, 2014).
On the day of the accident, the primary cause of the malfunctioning of the system
was the hierarchical order of state institutions. In this order of hierarchy, the Ministry
of Safety and Public Administration and the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries asked
the central office of the coast guard to take the lead in the rescue efforts. The coast
guard, in turn, handed responsibility off to the West Sea Regional Coast Guard, which
in turn asked the Mok-Po Coast Guard to form a central rescue office to head up rescue
efforts at the site of the accident.
This hierarchy was established in accordance with the 2013 revised Disaster and
Safety Management Organic Law, and its effect was that officials were unable to take
action proactively but instead had to wait for orders from the top (Roh, 2014). More-
over, the Ministry of Security and Public Administration lacked the relevant expertise,
since personnel from the National Emergency Management Agency, which had been
in charge before the revision to the law, had not yet moved to the ministry (Board of
Audit and Inspection, 2014).
Due to the institutional complexity of and lack of accountability within the South
Korean government, the public has failed to single out any clear-cut target to blame,
and most media outlets have focused on the de facto owner of Chunghaejin Shipping,
Yoo Byung-Un, members of his family, and Good News Mission, which is a “religion”
founded by Yoo (Sisainlive.com, 2014). In fact, most of the South Korean media
avoided discussing institutional failure and instead presented the Sewol tragedy as due
to the unethical behavior of the company owner. Thus, risk management was treated as
an individual failure rather than as a systematic problem affecting social institutions.
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Low Trust in Government
Low levels of trust in the Korean government weakened state authority. As a result,
socialized actors failed to comply with government-issued regulations. Thus, regula-
tions were ineffective in the case of the Sewol disaster, and it appears that government
actions after the tragedy merely reinforced this low level of trust.
Government officials at the Ministry of Security and Public Administration did not
receive accurate information as the tragedy was unfolding, and their press releases
reflected that fact. In particular, the ministry kept changing the figures with respect to
the number of passengers who had been rescued and kept claiming that the coast
guard was entering the ship and that rescuers had been mobilized when this was not
the case (Board of Audit and Inspection, 2014). The ministry was misinformed
because the information control structure was not arranged properly. In the initial
phase of the tragedy, more than 10 relief agencies in different branches of government
became involved. However, the Ministry of Security and Public Administration failed
to introduce a clear line of command, and therefore it was not in control of crucial
information during the rescue.
On May 19, 2014, President Park Geun-hye addressed the nation, announcing 
several reform schemes in the wake of the Sewol disaster. The most dramatic measure
was the creation of a new national security agency, concentrating all the safety-related
functions of the Korean Coast Guard, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, and the
National Emergency Management Agency. This single body is expected to take charge
of the central relief actors in the event of future tragedies. Another major reform measure
was the introduction of an agency to tackle the poor personnel management of the
Ministry of Security and Public Administration (Park, 2014). However, these measures
were criticized as mere bureaucratic reshuffling at a time when citizens wanted
improvement rather than reorganization (Roh, 2014). Firefighters, whose main agency
was supposed to be merged with the new national security agency, argued that the
focus should be on providing well-equipped frontline rescuers rather than on making
changes within central agencies (Kyunghyang, 2014).
In a democracy, government can be improved due to political dynamism deriving
from the legislative branch. Parliamentary organizations are especially important in
the aftermath of a tragedy, since they provide a venue in which representatives of civil
society can respond to the government’s proposed agenda. However, this political
dynamism does not appear to be in place in South Korean politics. Instead, parliamen-
tary affairs tend to reinforce the tendency of low trust in government.
Initially, the two biggest parties (the government party and the largest opposition
party, respectively) quickly consented to an inspection of the administration. The
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resulting bill was passed with a vast majority during the plenary session of the National
Assembly on May 29, 2014, and was to be implemented from June 2 to August 30
(Ohmynews, 2014). However, the inspection turned out to have little impact and the
Committee of Bereaved Families reported that after the inspection was concluded,
there were still 89 questions that had not been addressed. Jun Myung-sun, vice chair of
the Committee of Bereaved Families, said that “these reports were mere show. There
is no fruit” (Kyunghyang, 2014). The committee subsequently started a hunger strike
and a signature campaign to demand a special law to introduce an independent investi-
gatory commission for the accident, a commission that would ideally have the right to
directly prosecute guilty parties.
However, the content of the National Assembly draft bill put forward on August 7,
2014, and finally passed on November 7, 2014, did not follow the proposal of the
Committee of Bereaved Families. Instead, the two main parties agreed to introduce a
special 17-member commission that would be made up of 5 individuals from the ruling
party, 5 individuals from the major opposition party, 4 individuals from the Supreme
Court and Korean Bar Association, and 3 individuals representing the families of the
deceased. While the opposition party floor leader claimed that inclusion of 3 represen-
tatives from the families of the victims constituted success, representatives of the 
families of the deceased were more skeptical. The vice chair of the Committee of
Bereaved Families declared that “our opinion is not reflected in this draft” and that
therefore “we cannot accept [it]” (Ohmynews, 2014). In reaction to this criticism, the
major opposition party asked to renegotiate with the ruling party. However, the ruling
party refused to enter into such renegotiations.
On August 15, 2014, the floor leader of the ruling party suggested that politics
should once again focus on the issue of economic development of South Korea, thereby
reinstating the pattern of economic reductionism (Newstapa, 2014).
COMPARATIVE DISCUSSION
In South Korea, economic reductionism facilitated deregulatory policies and gave
rise to the MV Sewol tragedy. In Sweden, economic development has by contrast 
been historically balanced by a robust welfare system. Integrated and comprehensive
modernization in Sweden meant less deregulation and privatization in comparison
with South Korea.
These contrasting modes of modernity affected structures and agents alike. Chung-
haejin Shipping’s reckless pursuit of economic gain combined with a failure to comply
with laws, inadequate investment in its crews, and its bribery of commissioners all
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contributed to the disaster. By contrast, no illegal conduct was discovered after the 
MS Estonia disaster, since most of the ship’s crew were regular employees and were
certified for their positions. The MS Estonia tragedy was largely a “black swan” accident,
while the MV Sewol tragedy was a disaster that could easily have been avoided if the
relevant institutions had been functioning properly. In the case of the MS Estonia, the
crew made an effort to ensure the safety of passengers, even though they were unable
to save most of them because the ship sank so quickly. By contrast, the crew members
of the Sewol were the first to leave the ship.
After the Estonia sank, the Swedish prime minister was swiftly informed, and he
held a press conference at 11:30 am on the following morning. One day later, the
Swedish government established the Joint Accident Investigation Commission. Soon
after, the government worked with members of civil society, the Church of Sweden,
and other actors to set up a network of institutions to help deal with the crisis. The
government appointed a negotiator to serve as a mediator between the bereaved families
and the relevant state agencies and held a national day of mourning that enabled
Swedish citizens to share the pain of the members of their “imagined community.”
The community self prevailed in Sweden; by contrast, the individual self won out
in South Korea. Politicians, including the president, did not meet expectations, and 
citizens remained divided in their evaluation of issues connected with the MV Sewol
accident. In turn, most of the South Korean media singled out the owner of Chunghaejin
Shipping as the major guilty party, reinforcing the tendency to individualized risk
management in Korea and avoiding dealing with structural institutional causes that
lurked below the surface.
South Korean political debate subsequently focused on the reform of central agencies,
although the failure of front-line actors—due to structural proneness to corruption 
and other shortcomings—was equally significant in triggering the Sewol disaster. By
contrast, the Swedish government focused on improving the behavior of front-line
actors. In the case of the Estonia accident, corruption was not a contributing factor,
since the parliament’s auditing body exercised effective supervision. After the Estonia
disaster, the Swedish government not only appointed an international investigatory
body, the Joint Accident Investigation Commission, but also a national analysgruppen.
The analysgruppen regularly met with people affected by the tragedy to ensure that all
parties were represented and were provided with regular opportunities to voice their
views. Thus, the Swedish state avoided the sort of fragmented one-by-one examination
of institutional flaws that took place in South Korea during the inspections of June and
August 2014. Moreover, the bereaved families in South Korea were frequently ignored
by the legislators and cut off from public and media discourse.
In the case of the MS Estonia inquiry, the Joint Accident Investigation Commission
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and the analysgruppen collected substantial information and, after delivery of the final
report, set up an archive, the Estonia samlingen, to allow the general public access to
the results of the inquiry. Furthermore, the investigation subsequently contributed to
improved international maritime safety policies and national and international policy
learning.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
On November 7, 2014, 205 days after the April 16 sinking of the Sewol, the National
Assembly finally passed three bills related to the accident. These were, in order of
importance, a bill calling for the establishment of a 17-member special investigative
committee and the installation of a special prosecutor, a bill proposing the reorganization
of some government institutions such as the coast guard and the shifting of supervision
to a new office of public safety under the prime minister’s office, and a bill dealing
with the seizure of properties related to economic crimes (Kang, 2014).
While these bills were backed by large bipartisan majorities in the parliament and
potentially amount to steps in the right direction, the comparison with the Swedish
case strongly suggests that additional steps are necessary to break the vicious cycle of
low safety standards and low trust in South Korea. In the light of comparison with the
Swedish case, five policy recommendations should be considered: (1) appointing an
independent nonpoliticized task force to carry out thorough investigations without 
predetermined deadlines for a final report; (2) establishing a public Sewol archive in
line with the Estoniasamlingen; (3) expanding resources available to front-line actors
responsible for safety and rescue; (4) shifting the national audit body to the legislative
branch; and (5) internationalizing policy lessons derived from the MV Sewol tragedy.
First, the appointment of an independent investigative task force is essential for
policy development, as demonstrated by the Joint Accident Investigation Commission
and the analysgruppen in the Swedish case. In the case of the Scandinavian and
Swedish bodies, members were primarily drafted from among maritime and legal
experts and career politicians were with a single exception excluded. Both groups
were autonomous and were allowed an unlimited amount of time to conduct inquiries.
In South Korea, the special investigative committee is politicized to the extent that the
bill calls for the government and main opposition parties to fill 10 of the 17 seats, even
though impartial inquiry is most important for future risk management. Moreover,
scrutinizing Korean society in general is also necessary in order to advance reforms in
a holistic way and to avoid the fragmentation of institutions. There is a danger that the
South Korean special investigative committee will be subject to party politics and a
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time frame that is too limited.
Second, a public, state-financed and state-managed archive collecting all the infor-
mation related to the MV Sewol tragedy along the lines of Estoniasamlingen in Sweden
should be set up. While one observer (I. H. Kim, 2014) has proposed to set up a 
private archive rather than a state-managed one, under the assumption that the contents
of a state-managed one might be subject to political interference, such an approach
could be short-sighted because the South Korean government requires trust from citizens
to ensure their compliance with future safety policies. Moreover, the substantial
resources necessary to maintain such an archive would have to be provided by the
South Korean state. Installing a public archive could increase trust in government,
which could in turn break the vicious cycle of low trust.
Third, the reform of safety policies should focus on front-line actors rather than
top-down reorganization. The front-line actors directly deal with disasters and require
sufficient resources to do so successfully. Unfortunately, the policy discourses triggered
by the focusing event of the MV Sewol tragedy mostly concerned central governmental
agencies and issues related to frontline actors have hardly been discussed. When fire-
fighters raised their voices to ask for better equipment (Kyunghyang, 2014), their voices
should have been heard, and also the decision that was made by the government to cut
the use of temporary workers in safety-related occupations must be implemented.
Fourth, a shift of institutional supervision of the Board of Audit and Inspection,
currently located under the president’s office, to the National Assembly should be 
considered. From a normative point of view, the legislative branch represents a larger
variety of actors and a wider range of citizens compared to the president, who is elected
in a majoritarian fashion for a single term of five years. Such institutional change, which
would require constitutional reform, could potentially deliver a more independent
audit body for investigatory action. It could also help to limit the influence of bureau-fia
in the future by disassociating the auditing of safety measures from the executive branch.
Finally, the internationalization of policy lessons deriving from the Sewol disaster
is crucial. At present, the South Korean coastwise vessel industry does not meet the
international standard, and earlier rounds of deregulation contributed to the accident
(Cho, 2014). The International Maritime Organization imposed an international safety
management (ISM) code on oceangoing vessel industries after the famous Titanic
tragedy of 1912, and Sweden contributed to the elaboration of this code after the MS
Estonia tragedy. The South Korean coastwise vessel industry should also become
active in international maritime affairs, since crucial lessons can be drawn from the MV
Sewol tragedy. This could be another step in breaking the vicious cycle that prioritizes
the economic growth of the vessel industry over the safety of passengers.
In this article, two cyclically organized path dependencies have been discussed
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concerning the histories of modernization in Sweden and South Korea, with an
emphasis on a pronounced tragedy each country has experienced. Historical context
matters, as the MV Sewol tragedy makes clear. The string of man-made disasters must
be brought to a halt by breaking the path dependency of the vicious cycle in South
Korea. After the Sewol disaster, another major accident occurred on October 17, 2014
during a concert in Pan-gyo, when 10 people died after a ventilation grate collapsed
(Yonhapnews, 2014). This latest major accident demonstrates that the vicious cycle of
low safety standards has not been broken, even after the focusing event of the MV
Sewol tragedy.
Further modernization of South Korea requires a breakthrough in which state
agency will remain crucial. The five policies suggested here would allow the South
Korean government to regain trust. Higher levels of trust in government are important
as they provide one of the necessary preconditions for breaking the vicious cycle in
South Korea. Trust-building policies could break the vicious cycle; yet the government
needs to earn this trust first. Only a more trustworthy government could comprehen-
sively modernize the institutions and collectivize the risk management in line with
successful countries such as Sweden with its “imagined community.” Thus, shifting
toward a virtuous cycle of comprehensive modernization should be the aspiration of
policy makers in South Korea.
REFERENCES
Bae, J. M. 2006. Analysis exploring mechanisms of incompliance and cultural factors
in disasters. The Korean Governance Review, 13(1): 165-196.
Beck, U. 1986. Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. Frankfurt/M.:
Suhrkamp.
Birkland, T. A. 1998. Focusing events, mobilization, and agenda setting. Journal of
Public Policy, 18(1): 53-74.
Board of Audit and Inspection. 2014. Progress Report on the audit of the MV Sewol
tragedy. Seoul: Board of Audit and Inspection.
Byun, J. M. 2014. MV Sewol tragedy: The center of gravity shaken by manmade factors.
Donga Science, 341: 40-45.
Capoccia, G., & Kelemen, R. D. 2007. The study of critical junctures: Theory, narrative,
and counterfactuals in historical institutionalism. World Politics, 59(3): 341-369.
Cho, B. G. 2014. The MV Sewol tragedy and the oceangoing vessel industry. Maritime
Korea (June): 52-53.
Daegu Metropolitan City. 2005. The Daegu Metro fire calamity at Joongang-ro Station.
68 A Historical-Institutionalist Analysis of the MV Sewol and MS Estonia Tragedies
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
White paper. Daegu: Daegu Metropolitan City.
Dagens Nyheter. 2009. December 5.
Dagens Nyheter. 2014. September 27.
DongA-Ilbo. 1963. January 19.
DongA-Ilbo. 1970. December 23.
DongA-Ilbo. 1970. December 19.
Team EEJ. 2014. Republic of disasters. Episode 83, April 26.
Estoniasamlingen. 2014. Estoniasamlingen. Retrieved on November 17, 2014, from
www.estoniasamlingen.se.
Hani. 2013. July 26.
Hort, S. E. O. 2014a. Social policy, welfare state, and civil society in Sweden: History,
policies, and institutions, 1884-1988. 3rd enlarged ed. Lund: Arkiv förlag.
Hort, S. E. O. 2014b. Social policy, welfare state, and civil society in Sweden: The lost
world of social democracy, 1988-2015. 3rd enlarged ed. Lund: Arkiv förlag.
ILO (International Labour Organization). ILOSTAT Database. Retrieved on March 30,
2015 from www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/home/statisticaldata?_afrLoop=547137497
287982.
Immergut, E. M. 1998. The theoretical core of the new institutionalism. Politics and
Society, 26(1): 5-34.
Joint Accident Investigation Commission. 1998. Slutrapport: Ro-ro passagerarfärjan
MS Estonia s förlisning i Östersjön den 28 september 1994. Helsinki: Joint
Accident Investigation Commission.
Joongang Il-Bo. 2014. The MV Sewol, 100 days. Retrieved on October 20, 2014, from
joongang.joins.com/sewol ho.
Kang, M. J. 2014. Resemblance in Large Disasters: MV Chang-Gyung, MV Nam-Yung,
MV Seo-Hae, MV Sewol. Maritime Korea (June): 72-75.
Kim, D. Y. 2014. Reduced Modernity: South Korean Modernization and the Universal
Sociological History of Modernity. Seoul: Gil Press.
Kim, I. H. 2014. Let’s create a repository to memorialize the Sewol tragedy. History
Review, 107: 12-24.
Kim, J. G. 2004. The MV Sewol ferry tragedy. Maritime Korea (June): 116-121.
Kim, J. S. 2014. Managerial improvement in the coastwise vessel industry. Issue and
Point, July 18.
Kim, T. H. 2006a. Daegu Metro construction site gas explosion. National Archives of
Korea. Retrieved on July 31, 2014, from www.archives.go.kr/next/search/list
SubjectDescription.do?id=001926.
Kim, T. H. 2006b. Woo-Am commercial complex collapse. National Archives of
Korea. Retrieved on July 31, 2014, from www.archives.go.kr/next/search/list
A Historical-Institutionalist Analysis of the MV Sewol and MS Estonia Tragedies 69
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
SubjectDescription.do?id=001923.
Korea JoongAng Daily. 2014. November 8.
KOSIS (Korean Statistical Information Service). 2015. Economically Active Population
Survey. Retrieved on March 30, 2015 from www.kosis.kr/wnsearch/totalSearch.
jsp#.
Kumlin, S., Rothstein, B. 2005. Making and breaking social capital. Comparative
Political Studies, 38: 339-365.
Kyunghyang. 1953. January 13.
Kyunghyang. 1970. December 15.
Kyunghyang. 1994. December 8.
Kyunghyang. 2014. July 24.
Kyunghyang. 2014. May 29.
Lee, J. H. 2007. Incheon pub fire. National Archives of Korea. Retrieved on July 31,
2014, from www.archives.go.kr/next/search/listSubjectDescription.do?id=006956.
MBCnews. 1993. July 26.
MBCnews. 1993. March 28.
MBCnews. 1993. January 7.
MBCnews. 1993. June 19.
MBCnews. 1994. October 21.
MBCnews. 1994. October 22.
MBCnews. 1995. June 30.
Minbyun. 2014. 4.16 MV “Sewol”: The record of Minbyun. Paju: Beautiful People.
News1. 2014. April 30.
Newstapa. 2014. August 12.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2011. Education
Database. Retrieved on March 30, 2015, from data.oecd.org/eduresource/
private-spending-on-education.htm.
OECD. 2014. Society at a Glance 2014: OECD Social Indicators. Retrieved on November
24, 2014, from www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/society-at
-a-glance-2014_soc_glance-2014-en?vn_ipaddr=147.47.107.193&vn_userid=
1020722.
OECD. OECD.StatExtracts. Retrieved on November 24, 2014, from http://stats.oecd.org.
Oh, M. G. 2014. The way to avoid an unnatural death in a “MV Sewol tragedy-like
Society.” Retrieved on July 28, 2014, from www.pressian.com/news/article.
html?no=118440.
Ohmynews. 2014. May 29.
Ohmynews. 2014. August 7.
Park, D. G., et al. 2004. Case studies and system research for the establishment of 
70 A Historical-Institutionalist Analysis of the MV Sewol and MS Estonia Tragedies
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
disaster management support systems for military personnel and equipment.
Seoul: National Disaster Management Institute.
Park, G. H. 2014. Third senior secretary meeting briefing. Retrieved on November 24,
2014, from www1.president.go.kr/news/briefingList.php?srh[view_mode]=
detail&srh[seq]=4831.
Park, G. H. 2014. The MV Sewol tragedy. Maritime Korea (June): 154-159.
Roh, J. C. 2014. The social structural aspects of the MV Sewol tragedy and the limita-
tions of the disaster response system. Maritime Korea (June): 138-150.
Rothstein, B., & Uslaner, E. M. 2005. All for all: Equality, corruption, and social trust.
World Politics, 58: 41-72.
Shin, G. A. 2013. Marketised Individualization and welfare needs. Economy and 
Society, 98 (Summer): 266-303.
Sisainlive.com. 2014. May 2.
Slownews. 2014. July 26.
Son, J. M. 2005. Sixty years of cities in Korea. Paju: Hanul.
Statens Haverikommission, 2001. Brand på Herkulesgatan i Göteborg, O län, den 29-
30 oktober 1998. Karlstad: Statens räddningsverk.
Steinmo, S. 2008. Historical institutionalism. In D. Della Porta & M. Keating (eds.),
Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective
(pp. 118-138). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sveriges Riksdag. 1997. Analysgrupp för granskning av Estonia katastrofen och dess
följder. Retrieved on July 31, 2014, from www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/
Utredningar/Kommittedirektiv/Analysgrupp-for-granskning-av-_GLB1105.
Sveriges Television. 1992. May 22.
Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. 2014. Personskador Socialstyrelsens register.
Retrieved on October 15, 2014, from http://ida.msb.se/ida2#page=a0385.
Transparency International. 2014. Transparency International. Retrieved on October
27, 2014, from www.transparency.org/research/cpi/.
Weber, M. 1978. Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Woo, S. H. 2014. The ship we cannot get off of. Paju: Woong Jin Knowledge House.
Worldwide Governance Indicators. 2014. Documentation. Retrieved on October 27,
2014, from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc.
Yonhapnews. 1994. October 21.
Yonhapnews. 2014. July 24.
Yonhapnews. 2014. October 17.
Yonhapnews. 2014. July 30.
A Historical-Institutionalist Analysis of the MV Sewol and MS Estonia Tragedies 71
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
